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Abstract
We test the relevance of technical and fundamental variables in forming
currency portfolios. Carry, momentum and reversal all contribute to portfo-
lio performance, whereas the real exchange rate and the current account do
not. The resulting optimal portfolio outperforms the carry trade and other
naive benchmarks in an extensive 16 year out-of-sample test. Its returns are
not explained by risk and are valuable to diversied investors holding stocks
and bonds. Exposure to currencies increases the Sharpe ratio of diversied
portfolios by 0.5 on average, while reducing crash risk. We argue that cur-
rency returns are an anomaly which is gradually being corrected as hedge
fund capital increases.
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1 Introduction
Currency spot rates are nearly unpredictable out of sample (Meese and Rogo¤
(1983)).1 Usually, unpredictability is seen as evidence supporting market e¢ ciency,
but with currency spot rates it is quite the opposite it presents a challenge. Since
currencies have di¤erent interest rates, if the di¤erence in interest rates does not
forecast an o¤setting depreciation, then investors can borrow the low yielding
currencies to invest in the high yielding ones (Fama (1984)). This strategy, known
as the carry trade, has performed extremely well and for a long period without any
sensible economic explanation. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2008) show
that a well-diversied carry trade attains a Sharpe ratio that is more than double
that of the US stock market itself a famous puzzle (Mehra and Prescott (1985)).
Considerable e¤ort has been devoted to explaining the returns of the carry
trade as compensation for risk. Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011a) show
that the risk of carry trades across currency pairs is not completely diversiable,
so there is a systematic risk component. They form an empirically motivated
risk factor the return of high-yielding currencies minus low-yielding currencies
(HMLFX)close in spirit to the stock market factors of Fama and French (1992)
and show that it explains the carry premium. But the HMLFX is itself a currency
strategy, so linking its returns to more fundamental risk sources is an important
challenge for research in the currency market.
Some risks of the carry trade are well known. High yielding currencies are
known to go up by the stairs and down by the elevator,implying that the carry
trade has substantial crash risk. Carry performs worse when there are liquidity
squeezes (Brunnermeier, Nagel, and Pederson (2008)) and increases in foreign ex-
change volatility (Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011a)). Its risk
exposures are also time-varying, increasing in times of greater uncertainty (Chris-
tiansen, Ranaldo, and Söderllind (2010)).
Another possible explanation of the carry premium is that there is some peso
problemwith the carry trade the negative event that justies its returns may
simply have not occurred yet.2 Using options to hedge away the peso riskreduces
1See also Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual (2005), Rogo¤ and Stavrakeva (2008), Rogo¤ (2009)
2Barro (2006), Fahri and Gabaix (2007), Gourio, Siemer, and Verdelhan (2011), Burnside,
Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011).
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abnormal returns, lending some support to this view, but the remaining returns
depend crucially on the option strategy used for hedging (Jurek (2009)).
Despite our improved understanding of the risk of the carry trade, the fact
remains that conventional risk factors from the stock market (market, value, size,
momentum) or consumption growth models, do not explain its returns.3 Indeed,
an investor looking for signicant abnormal returns with respect to, say, the Fama-
French factors (1992), would do very well by just dropping all equities from the
portfolio and investing entirely in a passively managed currency carry portfolio
instead.
But there is more to the currency market than just the carry trade. Market
practitioners follow other strategies, including value and momentum (Levich and
Pojarliev (2011)). The benets of combining these di¤erent approaches became
apparent during the height of the nancial crisis when events in the currency
market assumed historical proportions.4 Figure 1 shows the performance of three
popular Deutsche Bank ETFs that track these strategies with the currencies of
the G10. From August 2008 to January 2009, the carry ETF experienced a severe
crash of 32.6%, alongside the stock market, commodities and high yield bonds.
Even so, this crash was not the peso event needed to rationalize its previous
returns.5 But in the same period, the momentum ETF delivered a 29.4% return
and the value ETF a 17.8% return. So while the carry trade crashed, a diversied
currency strategy fared quite well in this turbulent period.
Coincidently, the literature on alternative currency investments saw major de-
velopments since 2008. Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf (2011b) docu-
ment the properties of currency momentum, Burnside (2011) examines a combi-
nation of carry and momentum, Asness, Moskowitz, and Pederson (2009) study a
combination of value and momentum in currencies (and other asset classes), and
Jordà and Taylor (2009) combine carry, momentum and the real exchange rate.
Most of the studies on alternative currency strategies focus on simple, equal
weighted portfolios. The choice of simple portfolios is understandable as there
is substantial evidence indicating these typically outperform out-of-sample more
3Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Jordà and Taylor (2011).
4Melvin and Taylor (2009) provide a vivid narrative of the major events in the currency
market during the crisis.
5Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011).
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complex optimized portfolios.6 However, we nd that using the historical data up
to 2007, an investor would have no reason to want to equal-weight momentum,
value and carry. Optimized portfolios are a closer reection of the uncertainties
faced by investors in real time. Namely, they have to deal with the choice of what
signals to use, how to weigh each signal, and how to address measurement error
and transaction costs.
To study the risk and return of currency strategies in a more realistic setting,
we use the parametric portfolio policies approach of Brandt, Santa-Clara, and
Valkanov (2009) and test the relevance of di¤erent variables in forming currency
portfolios.
First, we use a pre-sample test to study which characteristics matter for invest-
ment purposes. We test the relevance of the interest rate spread (and its sign),
momentum and three proxies for value: reversal, the real exchange rate, and the
current account. Including all characteristics simultaneously in the test, allows us
to see which are relevant and which are subsumed by others. Then we conduct
a comprehensive out-of-sample (OOS) exercise with 16 years of monthly returns.
This aims to minimize forward-looking bias though it does not eliminate it com-
pletely.7
We nd that the interest rate spread, momentum and reversal create economic
value for investors whereas fundamentals as the current account and the real ex-
change rate dont. The strategy combining the relevant signals increases the Sharpe
ratio relative to an equal-weighted carry portfolio from 0.57 to 0.86, out-of-sample
and after transaction costs. This is a 0.29 gain, about the same as the Sharpe
ratio of the stock market in the same period.
Transaction costs matter in currency markets. Taking transaction costs into
account in the optimization further increases the Sharpe ratio to 1.06, a total gain
of 0.49 over the equal-weighted carry benchmark. The gains in certainty equivalent
are even more expressive as the optimal diversied strategy substantially reduces
crash risk.
6DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009), Jacobs, Müller, and Weber (2010).
7After all, would we be conducting the same out-of-sample exercise in the rst place if there
were no indications in the literature that momentum and value worked in recent years? Still,
unlike naive portfolios, our strategy will not invest in these signals more than justied by the
historical data up to that moment in time.
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Unlike the typical result in OOS tests of optimized equity portfolios, we nd
that the optimized portfolio outperforms all naive benchmarks.8 Also, the risk
factors recently proposed to explain carry returns do not explain the returns of the
optimized portfolio, which has monthly s ranging between 1.73 and 2.38 percent.
So, while these risk factors may have some success explaining carry returns, they
struggle to make sense of our optimal currency strategy.
We assess the benets of diversication across currency investment strategies
for investors already exposed to other asset classes. We nd an average increase in
the Sharpe ratio of 0.51, a much more impressive gain than the 0.09 increase doc-
umented in Kroencke, Schindler, and Schrimpf (2011). Furthermore, including the
currency strategies in the portfolio consistently reduces fat tails and left skewness.
This contradicts crash-risk explanations for returns in the currency market.
Finally, we regress the returns of the optimal strategy on the level of specula-
tive capital in the market, following Jylhä and Suominen (2011). We nd evidence
that the returns of the strategy decline as the amount of hedge fund capital in-
creases. This suggests that the returns we document constitute an anomaly that
is gradually being arbitraged away by hedge funds.
Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we explain the implementation
of parametric portfolios of currencies. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis.
Section 3.1 describes the data and the variables used in the optimization. Sections
3.2 and 3.3 present the investment performance of the optimal portfolios in and
out of sample, respectively. Section 4 compares the performance of the optimal
portfolio with naive benchmarks. In Section 5 we test the risk exposures of the
optimal portfolio. In Section 6 we assess the value of currency strategies for in-
vestors holding stocks and bonds. Section 7 discusses possible explanations for the
abnormal returns of the strategy, including insu¢ cient speculative capital early in
the sample.
8Brandt, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2009) optimized portfolio of stocks also outperforms
OOS naive benchmarks.
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2 Optimal parametric portfolios of currencies
We optimize currency portfolios from the perspective of an US investor in the
forward exchange market. In the forward exchange market, the investor can agree
at time t to buy currency i at time t+1 for 1=F it;t+1 where F
i
t;t+1 is the price of one
USD expressed in foreign currency units (FCU). Then at time t + 1 the investor
liquidates the position selling the currency for 1/Sit+1; where S
i
t+1 is the spot price
of one USD in FCU. The return (in US dollars) of a long position in currency i in
month t is:
rit+1 =
F it;t+1
Sit+1
  1 (1)
This is a zero-investment strategy as it consists of positions in the forward
market only.9 We use one-month forwards throughout as is standard in the litera-
ture.10 Therefore all returns are monthly and there are no inherited positions from
month to month. This also avoids path-dependency when we include transaction
costs in the analysis.
We optimize the currency strategies using the parametric portfolio policies ap-
proach of Brandt, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2009). This method models the
weights of assets as a function of their characteristics. The implicit assumption
is that the characteristics convey all relevant information about the assetscondi-
tional distribution of returns. The weight on currency i at time t is:
wi;t = 
Txi;t=Nt (2)
where xi;t is a k  1 vector of currency characteristics,  is a k  1 parameter
vector to be estimated and Nt is the number of currencies available in the dataset
at time t. Dividing by Nt keeps the policy stationary (see Brandt, Santa-Clara,
and Valkanov (2009)). We do not place any restriction on the weights, which can
9In reality investors need to post collateral to take positions in forward markets. We ignore
that in this study.
10Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2008), Burnside (2011), Burnside, Eichenbaum,
Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011), Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling and Schrimpf (2011a,b).
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be positive or negative. This reects the fact that in the forward exchange market
there is no obvious non-negativity constraint.
The strategies we examine consist of an investment of 100% in the US risk-free
asset, yielding rfUSt ; and a long-short portfolio in the forward exchange market.
For a given sample,  uniquely determines a parametric portfolio policy, and the
corresponding return each period will be:
rp;t+1 = rf
US
t +
NtX
i=1
wi;tr
i
t+1 (3)
The problem an investor faces is optimizing its objective function picking the
best possible  for the sample:
max

Et [U(rp;t+1)] (4)
We use power utility as the objective function:
U(rp) =
(1 + rp)
1 
1   (5)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion (CRRA).11 The main advantage of
this utility function is that it penalizes kurtosis and skewness, as opposed to mean-
variance utility, which focuses only on the rst two moments of the distribution
of returns. So our investor dislikes crash risk and values characteristics that help
reduce it, even if these do not add to the Sharpe ratio.
The main restriction imposed on the investors problem is that  is kept con-
stant across time. This substantially reduces the chances for in-sample overtting
as only a k 1 vector of characteristics is estimated. The assumption that  does
not change allows its estimation using the sample counterparts:
^ = argmax

1
T
T 1X
t=0
U
 
rfUSt +
NtX
i=1
(Txi;t=Nt)r
i
t+1
!
(6)
11Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) estimate  empirically from risk-aversion implicit in one-
month options on the S&P and the FTSE and nd a value very close to 4. We adopt this value
and keep it thoughout. The most important measures of economic performance of the strategy
are scale-invariant (Sharpe ratio, skewness, kurtosis), so the specic choice of CRRA utility is
not of crucial importance.
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For statistical inference purposes, Brandt, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2009) show
that we can use either the asymptotic covariance matrix of ^ or bootstrap meth-
ods.12
For the interpretation of results it is important to note that (6) optimizes a
utility function and not a measure of the distance between forecasted and realized
returns. Therefore,  can be found relevant for one characteristic even if it conveys
no information at all about expected returns. The characteristic may just be a
predictor of a currencys contribution to the overall skewness or kurtosis of the
portfolio, for example. Conversely, a characteristic may be found irrelevant for
investment purposes even if it does help in forecasting returns. Indeed, it may
forecast both higher returns and higher risk for a currency, o¤ering a trade-o¤
that is irrelevant for the investors utility function.
Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011b) show that momentum strate-
gies incur higher transaction costs than the carry trade. They even nd that mo-
mentum prots are of little relevance in currencies of developed countries after
transaction costs. So one valid concern is whether the gains of combining mo-
mentum with carry persist after taking into consideration time and cross-currency
variation in transaction costs. Fortunately, parametric portfolio policies can easily
incorporate transaction costs that vary across currencies and over time. This is a
particularly appealing feature of the method, since transaction costs varied sub-
stantially as foreign exchange trading shifted towards electronic crossing networks.
To address this issue we optimize:
^ = argmax

1
T
T 1X
t=0
U
 
rfUSt +
NtX
i=1
(Txi;t=Nt)r
i
t+1  
NtX
i=1
Txi;t=Nt ci;t! (7)
where ci;t is the transaction cost of currency i at time t; which we calculate as:
ci;t =
F askt;t+1   F bidt;t+1
F askt;t+1 + F
bid
t;t+1
(8)
This is one half of the bid-ask spread as a percentage of the mid-quote. This
12We use bootstrap methods for standard errors in the empirical part of this paper, as these
are slightly more conservative and do not rely on asymptotic results.
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assumes the investor buys (sells) a currency in the forward market at the ask
(bid) price, and the forward is settled at the next months spot rate. This may
overstate transaction costs. For instance, Mancini, Ranaldo, and Wrampelmeyer
(2011) document that e¤ective costs in the spot market are less than half those
implied by bid-ask quotes as there is signicant within-quote trading.
There is another important point to highlight about transaction costs: for a
given month and currency, these are proportional to the absolute weight put on
that particular currency. This absolute weight is a function of all the currency
characteristics as seen in equation 2, so transaction costs will depend crucially on
the time-varying interaction between characteristics. One example is the interac-
tion between momentum and other characteristics. As Grundy and Martin (2001)
show for stocks, the way momentum portfolios are built guarantees time-varying
interaction with other stock characteristics. For instance, after a bear market,
winners tend to be low-beta stocks and the reverse for losers. So the momentum
portfolio, long in previous winners and short in previous losers, will have a negative
beta. The opposite holds after a bull market. The same applies for currencies,
after a period where carry experienced high returns, high yielding currencies tend
to have positive momentum. In this case, momentum reinforces the carry signal
and results in larger absolute weights and thus higher transaction costs. However,
after negative carry returns the opposite happens: high yielding currencies have
negative momentum. So momentum partially o¤sets the carry signal resulting
in smaller absolute weights and actually reduces the overall transaction costs of
the portfolio. This means the transaction costs of including momentum for an
extended period of time in a diversied portfolio policy will be lower than what
one nds examining momentum in isolation as in Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and
Schrimpf (2011b).
3 Empirical analysis
As gure 1 shows, combining reversal and momentum with the carry trade consid-
erably mitigated the crash of the carry trade in the last quarter of 2008. Yet this
is easy to point out ex post. The relevant question is whether investors in the cur-
rency market had reasons to believe in the virtue of diversifying their investment
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strategy before the 2008 crash. For example, Levich and Pojarliev (2011) examine
a sample of currency managers and nd that they explored carry, momentum and
value strategies before the crisis but shifted substantially across investment styles
over time. In particular, right before the height of the nancial crisis in the last
quarter of 2008, most currency managers were heavily exposed to the carry trade,
neutral on momentum and investing against value. This raises the question of
whether the benets of diversication were as clear before the crisis as they later
became apparent. Equally weighting carry, momentum was not an obvious strat-
egy at the time. This also shows that what appear to be naively simple strategies
such as equal weighting carry, momentum, and value are not naive at all and in
fact benet a lot from hindsight.
To address this issue we conduct two tests: i) a pre-sample test with the rst
20 years of data up to 1996 to determine which characteristics were relevant back
then; ii) an out-of-sample experiment since 1996 in which the investor chooses the
weight to put on each signal using only historical information available up to each
moment in time.
Section 3.1. explains the data sources and the variables used in our optimiza-
tion. In section 3.2. we conduct the pre-sample test with the sample from 1976:02
to 1996:02. In section 3.3. we conduct the out-of-sample experiment of portfolio
optimization using only the relevant variables identied in the pre-sample test.
3.1 Data
We use data on exchange rates, the forward discount / premium, and the real ex-
change rate for the Euro zone and 27 member countries of the Organization for Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The countries in the sample are: Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the UK, and the US.
The exchange rate data are from Datastream. They include spot exchange rates
at monthly frequency from November 1960 to December 2011 and one-month for-
ward exchange rates from February 1976. As in Burnside, Eichenbaum, Kleshchel-
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ski, and Rebelo (2011) we merge two datasets of forward exchange rates (against
the USD and the GBP) to have a comprehensive sample of returns in the forward
market in the oating exchange rate era.13
We calculate the real exchange rates of each currency against the USD using
the spot exchange rates and the consumer price index. The Consumer Price In-
dex (CPI) data come from the OECD/Main Economic Indicators (MEI) online
database. For the Euro, the series that starts January 1996 was extended back
to January 1988 using the weights of the Euro founding members. In the case of
Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland (before November 1975) only quarterly data
are available. In those cases, the value of the last available period was carried
forward to the next month.
We test the economic relevance of carry, momentum, and value proxies com-
bined in a currency market investment strategy. The variables used in the opti-
mization exercise are:
1. signi;t: The sign of the forward discount of a currency with respect to the
USD. It is 1 if the foreign currency is trading at a discount (Fi;t > Si;t) and
-1 if it trades at a premium. This is the carry trade strategy examined
in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2008), Burnside (2011), Burnside,
Eichenbaum, Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2011). Given the extensive study of
this strategy we adopt it as the benchmark throughout the paper.
2. fdi;t: The interest rate spread or the forward discount on the currency. We
standardize the forward discount using the cross-section mean and standard
deviation across all countries available at time t, FDt and FDt respectively.
Specically, denoting the (unstandardized) forward discount as FDi;t; we
obtain the standardized discount as: fdi;t =
FDi;t FDt
FDt
: This cross-sectional
standardization measures the forward discount in standard deviations above
or below the average across all countries. By construction, a variable stan-
dardized in the cross-section will have zero mean, implying that the strategy
is neutral in terms of the base currency (the US dollar). Jurek (2009) shows
13The rst dataset has data on forward exchange rates (bid and ask quotes) against the GBP
from 1976 to 1996 and the second dataset has the same information for quotes against the USD
from 1996 to 2011.
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that an interest rate spread strategy similar to this outperforms the equally-
weighted carry trade based on sign.
3. momi;t: For currency momentum we use the cumulative currency appreci-
ation in the last three-month period, cross-sectionally standardized. This
variable explores the short-term persistence in currency returns. We use mo-
mentum in the previous three months because there is ample evidence for
persistence in returns for portfolios with this formation period while there are
no signicant gains (in fact the momentum e¤ect is often smaller) consider-
ing longer formation periods (see Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf
(2011b)). Three-month momentum was also used in Kroencke, Schindler,
and Schrimpf (2011). Cross-sectional standardizations means that momen-
tum measures relative performance. Even if all currencies fall relative to the
USD those that fall less will have positive momentum.
4. revi;t: Long-term reversal is the cumulative real currency depreciation in
the previous ve years, standardized cross-sectionally. First we calculate the
cumulative real depreciation of currency i between the basis period (h) and
moment t as an index number Qi;h;t =
Si;tCPIi;h 2CPIUSt 2
Si;hCPIi;t 2CPIUSh 2
:We use a two-month
lag to ensure the CPI is known. We pick h = t   60 which corresponds to
5 years: Then we standardize Qi;h;t cross-sectionally to obtain revi;t: This
is essentially the same as the notion of currency value used in Asness,
Moskowitz, and Pederson (2009). We just use the cumulative deviation from
purchasing power parity, instead of the cumulative return as they did, to
obtain a longer out-of-sample test period. Reversal is positive for those
currencies that experienced the larger real depreciations against the USD in
the previous 5 years and negative for the others.
5. qi;t: The real exchange rate standardized by its historical mean and stan-
dard deviation. First, as for reversal, we compute Qi;hi;t with the di¤er-
ence that here the basis period (hi) is the rst month for which there is
CPI and exchange rate data available for currency i. Then we compute
qi;t =
Qi;hi;t Qi;t
Qi;t
; where Qi;t is the historical average
tP
j=hi
Qi;hi;j=t and Qi;t is
the historical standard deviation 
 fQi;hi;jgtj=hi : The real exchange rate is
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measured in standard deviations above or below the historical average. Jordà
and Taylor (2009) also used the de-meaned real exchange rate but our time
series standardization ensures only information available up to each moment
in time is used. Unlike rev ; which is cross-sectionally standardized, q is not
neutral in terms of the basis currency (the USD). It will tend to be positive
for all currencies when these are undervalued against the USD by historical
standards.
6. cai;t: The current account of the foreign economy as a percentage of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), standardized cross-sectionally. The optimization
assumes that the previous year current account information becomes known
in April of the current year. The current account data were retrieved from the
Annual Macroeconomic database of the European Commission (AMECO),
where data are available on a yearly frequency from 1960 onward. Many
studies examine the relation between the current account and exchange rates
justifying its inclusion as a conditional variable.14
In order to be considered for the trading strategies, a currency must satisfy
three criteria: i) there must be ten previous years of real exchange rate data; ii)
current forward and spot exchange quotes must be available; and iii) the country
must be an OECD member in the period considered. After ltering out missing
observations, there are a minimum of 13 and a maximum of 21 currencies in the
sample. On average there are 16 currencies in the sample.
3.2 Pre-sample results
Table 1 shows the investment performance of the optimized strategies from 1976:02
to 1996:02. We use this pre-sample period to check which variables had strong
enough evidence supporting their relevance back in 1996, before starting the out-
of-sample experiment.
The two versions of the carry trade (sign and fd) deliver similar performance,
with high Sharpe ratios (0.96 and 0.99, respectively) but also with signicant
14See, for example, Dornbusch and Fischer (1980), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2005), Gourinchas
and Rey (2007).
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crash risk (as captured by excess kurtosis and left-skewness). Momentum provides
a Sharpe ratio of 0.56, better than the performance of the stock market of 0.40 in
the same sample. This conrms the results of Okunev andWhite (2003), Burnside,
Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), and Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf
(2011b).
Financial predictors work better in our optimization than fundamentals like the
real exchange rate and the current account. Reversal had an interesting Sharpe ra-
tio of 0.36. This conrms the results of Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf
(2011b) and Asness, Moskowitz, and Pederson (2009). The strategies using the
current account and the real exchange rate as conditioning variables achieved mod-
est Sharpe ratios (of 0.16 and 0.07), not at all impressive especially as this is an
in-sample optimization.15
The seventh row shows the performance of an optimal strategy combining the
carry (both sign and fd) with momentum and reversal all the statistically rele-
vant variables. Already in 1996 there was ample evidence indicating that a strategy
combining di¤erent variables lead to substantial gains. The Sharpe ratio of the
optimal strategy was nearly 40% higher than the benchmark and it produced a
16.43 percentage points gain in annual certainty equivalent.
Adding fundamentals to this strategy does not improve it: the Sharpe ratio
increases only 0.01 and the annual certainty equivalent only 13 basis points. An
insignicant gain since in-sample any additional variable must always increase
utility.
Table 2 shows the statistical signicance of the variables, isolated and in com-
bination. The table presents the point-estimates of the coe¢ cients and the boot-
strapped p-values (in brackets). We perform the bootstrap by generating 1,000
random samples drawn with replacement from the original sample and with the
same number of observations (240 months of returns and respective conditional
variables). Then we nd the optimal coe¢ cients in each random sample, thereby
obtaining theyr distribution across samples.
Taken in isolation, the carry trade variables (sign and fd) and momentum are
15We also tested these variables out-of-sample (although, based on the in-sample evidence, the
investor would choose not to consider them) and found that they did not add to the economic
value of the strategy.
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all signicant at the 1% level. Reversal has a p-value of 5.3%.
The current account and the real exchange rate have the wrong sign (under-
weighing undervalued currencies and those with strong current accounts) but are
not signicant. We have known since Meese and Rogo¤ (1983), currency spot rates
are nearly unpredictable by fundamentals. Using time-series methods, Gourinchas
and Rey (2007) nd that the current account forecasts the spot exchange rate of
the US dollar against a basket of currencies.16 But we nd no evidence in the cross
section that the current account is relevant for designing a protable portfolio of
currencies. At best, the fundamental information is subsumed by interest rates,
momentum and reversal.
Combining all variables conrms our main result. Carry, momentum and re-
versal are relevant for the optimization, fundamentals are not. The nal row shows
the results for an optimization using only the variables deemed relevant. The p-
values show the four variables contribute signicantly to the economic value of the
strategy in combination.
Concerning both carry variables (sign and fd), the correlation of their returns
was 0.46 from 1976:02 to 1996:02, a value that has not changed much since. So
these two ways of implementing the carry trade are not identical and the investor
nds it optimal to use both. The sign variable assigns the same weight to a
currency yielding 0.1% more than the USD as to another yielding 5% more. In
contrast, the fd variable assigns weights proportionally to the magnitude of the
interest rate di¤erential. Whenever the USD interest rate is close to the extremes
of cross section, the sign is very exposed to variations in its value, while fd is
always dollar-neutral.
One word of caution on forward-looking bias is needed here. Our in-sample test
shows that in 1996 some of the strategies recently proposed in the literature on
currency returns would already be found to have an interesting performance. This
is a necessary condition to assess if investors would want to use these variables in
real time to build diversied currency portfolios. However, this does not tell us
whether there were other investment approaches that would have seemed relevant
in 1996 and resulted afterwards in poor economic performance.
16Gourinchas and Rey (2007) derive their result making a di¤erent use of the current account
information. Namely, they detrend it and also consider net foreign wealth.
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3.3 Out-of-sample results
We perform an out-of-sample (OOS) experiment to test the robustness of the opti-
mal portfolio combining carry, momentum, and value strategies. The rst optimal
parametric portfolio is estimated using the initial 240 months of the sample. Then
the model is re-estimated every month, using an expanding window of data, un-
til the end of the sample. The out-of-sample returns thus obtained minimize the
problem of look-ahead bias. We do not use q and ca in the optimization as these
failed to pass the in-sample test with data until 1996.17
The in-sample results also hold out of sample. Table 3 shows that the model
using interest rate variables, momentum and reversal achieves a certainty equiva-
lent gain of 10.84 percent over the benchmark, with better kurtosis and skewness.
Its Sharpe ratio is 1.15, a gain of 0.45 over the benchmark sign portfolio.
Transaction costs can considerably hamper the performance of an investment
strategy. For example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) provide compelling evidence
that there is momentum in stock prices, but Lesmond et al. (2004) nd that
after taking transaction costs into consideration there are little to no gains to be
obtained in exploiting momentum.
Panel B of table 3 shows the OOS performance of the strategies after tak-
ing transaction costs into consideration. Clearly transaction costs matter. The
Sharpe ratio of the optimal strategy is reduced by 0.29, a magnitude similar to
the equity premium, and the certainty equivalent drops from 18.87 percent to just
12.15 percent. Momentum and reversal individually show no protability at all
after transaction costs. This nding mirrors the results of Lesmond et al. (2004)
with regard to stock momentum. It also conrms the result in Menkho¤, Sarno,
Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011b) that there are no signicant momentum prots
in currencies of developed countries after transaction costs.
But we nd that transaction costs can be managed. In panel C we adjust
the optimization to currency and time-specic transaction costs. We calculate the
cost-adjusted interest rate spread variable as: gFDi;t = sign(FDit)(jFDitj   cit)
and standardize it in the cross-section to get ffdit. We then model the parametric
17Although including these does not change much the results as they receive little weight in
the optimization.
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weight function as:
wi;t = I(cit < jFDitj)

Txi;t=Nt

(9)
where I(:) is the indicator function, with a value of one if the condition holds
and zero otherwise. We maximize expected utility with this new portfolio policy,
estimating  after consideration of transaction costs.
This method e¤ectively eliminates from the sample currencies with prohibitive
transaction costs and reduces the exposure to those that have a high ratio of cost
to forward discount. Other, more complex, rules might lead to better results, but
we refrain from this pursuit as this simple approach is enough to prove the point
that managing transaction costs adds considerable value.
The procedure increases the Sharpe ratio of the diversied strategy from 0.86
to 1.06 and produces a gain in the certainty equivalent of 4.54 percent per year.
This gain alone is higher than the momentum or reversal certainty equivalents per
se. Indeed, the performance of the diversied strategy with managed transaction
costs is very close to the strategy in panel A without transaction costs.
Managing transaction costs is particularly important as these currency strate-
gies are leveraged. Given the high Sharpe ratios attainable by investing in cur-
rencies, the optimization picks high levels of leverage. We dene leverage as
Lt =
NtP
i=1
jwitj: This is the absolute value of US dollars risked in the currency strat-
egy per dollar invested in the risk-free asset. The optimal strategy has a mean
leverage of 5.94 in the OOS period of 1996:03 to 2011:12. As a result, a small dif-
ference in transaction costs can have a large impact in the economic performance
of the strategy.
One concern in optimized portfolios is whether in-sample overtting leads to
unstable and erratic coe¢ cients OOS. Figure 2 shows the estimated coe¢ cients of
the diversied portfolio with managed costs in the OOS period. The coe¢ cients
of the four variables used are very stable, leading to consistent exposure to the
conditioning variables.
The optimal diversied portfolio has a robust OOS economic performance. In
the next section we compare it with simple strategies proposed in the literature.
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4 Comparison with naive currency strategies
We want to assess the importance of using our optmization procedure by com-
paring our strategy with simple alternatives. This is especially important because
DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) show that simple rules of investment have
robust out-of-sample performance when compared to optimized portfolios. One
could argue though that simple currency strategies are not so naive. The perfor-
mance of long-short portfolios depends on the characteristic used to sort currencies
in the rst place. The choice of characteristics to average is thus crucial. Why
carry, momentum and reversal and not something else? There is the choice of
designing a strategy that is neutral in terms of the basis currency (as fd) or not
(as sign): The weighing of di¤erent currency characteristics is also arbitrary in a
naive strategy. So the scope for arbitrary choices inuenced by ex post observation
of the data is not necessarily small for naive strategies. Still, the simple strate-
gies found in the literature provide a natural benchmark for our optimal portfolio
policy.
We compare the economic performance of the optimal diversied strategy with
5 simple portfolios: i) the sign strategy, which is long currencies yielding more than
the USD and short the others; ii) the version of momentum (momb) proposed in
Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) which is long currencies with a positive
return in the previous month and short the others; iii) an equal-weighted combi-
nation of sign and momentum; iv) the interest rate spread strategy (fd); v) an
equal-weighted portfolio of the signals used in our portfolio policy momentum,
reversal, sign and fd.
It is questionable whether the EW strategy is a naive approach since this
strategy uses the signals selected by the optimized portfolio. But including this
EW portfolio allows an assessment of how relevant it is to manage transaction
costs and to allow the coe¢ cients in the strategy to di¤er from equality.
Table 4 shows the economic performance of the optimal strategy compared
to the simple alternatives. All strategies include a 100% investment in the risk
free asset complemented with a long-short currency portfolio. We scale all simple
strategies to have constant leverage throughout the period, set to match the mean
leverage of the optimized strategy. This ensures that di¤erences in performance
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do not depend on di¤erences in leverage. Note that the leverage of the portfolio
is optimally chosen indirectly in the maximization of the utility function. The
leverage (Lt =
NtP
i=1
jwitj =
NtP
i=1
jxitj=Nt) depends both on the estimated coe¢ cients
and on the level of the explanatory variables and therefore changes through time.
We also include a version of the optimal strategy with constant leverage to assess
if time-varying leverage is important to performance.
The optimal strategy, with a Sharpe ratio of 1.06 and a certainty equivalent of
16.69 percent, outperforms all others. The 0.22 gain in Sharpe ratio with respect
to the EW strategy (the naiveapproach that performed the best) is statistically
signicant with a p-value of 0.027.18This is because the optimal coe¢ cients are not
equal (as seen in Figure 2) and the simple strategy does not manage transaction
costs. The gain in certainty equivalent of 7.13 percentage points is even more
expressive.
Perhaps surprising is the unimpressive performance of the combination of
sign and momb: It achieves a lower Sharpe ratio than the sign strategy alone.
This is because leverage is set to a constant level, so the outperformance of this
strategy documented in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) comes from
time-varying leverage. Whenever a currency yields more than the USD but ex-
periences a negative return in the previous month, the two signals cancel out
resulting in a weight of zero for the currency. As a result, the combination of
sign and momb has time-varying leverage, increasing after months when carry has
positive returns and decreasing otherwise.
The optimal strategy with constant leverage has a good performance, with a
Sharpe ratio of 0.99, though not as good as the unconstrained strategy. Allowing
leverage to change over time leads to lower kurtosis and less negative skewness.
All in all, the evidence on economic performance is clear: the optimal strategy
produces a certainty equivalent gain of 7.13 percentage points per year over the
best performing naive strategy. This gain is due to a higher Sharpe ratio and lower
crash risk (as captured by kurtosis and left-skewness).
In table 5 we regress the excess returns of the optimal strategy on those of the
simple portfolios to assess its abnormal returns, captured by the intercept. The
18Computed with same method as DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009).
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t-statistics and R-squares are obviously signicant, since the optimal strategy is
built with similar variables as the naive strategies. But these variables do not fully
explain the excess returns which range from 0.68 to 2.28 percent per month. The
optimal strategy shows an abnormal return of 8.16 percent per year with respect
to the best performing naive strategy.
Figure 3 shows the cumulative excess returns of each naive strategy compared
to the optimal diversied portfolio. We also include the excess return on the stock
market portfolio for comparison. Currency strategies in general outperform the
stock market. The Sharpe ratio of the stock market in the OOS period is 0.29,
lower than any currency strategy examined.
But the graph also shows that no simple portfolio systematically outperforms
the optimal strategy. This contrasts with the result of DeMiguel, Garlappi, and
Uppal (2009) for stocks. This result extends and conrms recent ndings that
optimization methods can outperform more naive approaches in currency markets
(Corte, Sarno, Tsiakas (2009), Berge, Jordà, and Taylor ( 2010)).
5 Risk exposures
Cochrane (2011) uses the expression factor zooto describe the growing number
of risk factors proposed in the literature to explain asset returns. The literature on
currency markets is no exception and many sets of risk factors have been proposed,
mostly to explain the returns of the carry trade.
Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011a) propose an empirically-motivated
high-minus-low factor of currencies sorted on interest rates (HMLFX) to explain
carry trade returns. This is an approach similar in spirit to the Fama and French
(1992) three-factor model for stock returns. Note however that the HMLFX factor
is itself by construction a carry portfolio. So while this approach establishes that
there is systematic risk in the carry trade, it does not provide intuition on what
is the fundamental risk source that justies its returns. Brunnermeier, Nagel,
and Pederson (2008) argue that liquidity-risk spirals are the source of risk of the
carry trade. They use the innovation in the TED spread and in the VIX as
factors proxying for liquidity and risk. Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf
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(2011a) propose innovations in foreign exchange market volatility as a risk factor
to explain the carry trade and currency momentum. They also use the innovation
in average transaction costs and argue the information in this is subsumed by FX
volatility. Lustig and Verdelhan (2007) and Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan
(2011b) propose consumption growth risk as a factor to explain the carry returns.
Table 6 shows the exposure of the optimal diversied strategy (with managed
transaction costs) to 8 sets of risk factors.
The rst model shows that the currency strategy is not exposed to consumption
growth risk.19 This conrms the results of Burnside (2011) and Jordà and Taylor
(2011).
The second and third models show that our strategy is exposed to liquidity risk
(as captured by innovations in the TED spread) and increases in stock volatility
(as captured by the changes in VIX). The VIX is a more signicant variable, its
beta has a t-statistic of -3.98 versus -2.90 for the TED spread.
The fourth model regresses the returns of the optimal strategy on innovations
in transaction costs (the cross-section average in the forward exchange market).
This does not yield signicant results as the adjusted R-squared is negative.
The fth model shows the diversied portfolio, with a t-statistic of -2.15, is
exposed to innovations in foreign exchange volatility conrming Menkho¤, Sarno,
Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011a).20 But the adjusted R-squared is only 1.88, much
less than the 7.27 of the VIX.
Our optimal strategy is also somewhat exposed to stock market risk as the
CAPM and the Carhart (1997) models show. But the only relevant variable is the
excess return on the market portfolio with a t-statistic of 4.02 in the CAPM and
4.08 in the Carhart four-factor model.
The best performing model, in term of adjusted R-squared, is the empirically-
motivated HMLFX factor of Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011a). In this
model we regress the optimal portfolio excess returns on RX (the dollar-return of
19For this we use the monthly growth rate of Real Personal Consumption Expenditures don-
wloaded from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis.
20We follow Menkho¤, Sarno, Schmeling, and Schrimpf (2011a) in computing FX volatility in
month t as: FX;t = 1Dt
DtP
=1
NP
i=1
jri;j
N
; where Dt is the number of trading days in month t and
N is the number of currencies available in day  :
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an equal-weighted average of all currency portfolios) andHMLFX ; the di¤erence in
return between the highest yielding currencies and the lowest yielding currencies.21
The beta with respect to the HMLFX is clearly signicant, with a t-stat of 6.54,
and the adjusted R-squared of 20.85 is by far the highest among the eight models
used.
But the most striking result is the consistently high  of the optimal strategy,
ranging between 1.73 and 2.38 percent per month, always signicant at conven-
tional levels of condence. So, while the optimal strategy is exposed to some of the
factors proposed in the literature on currency returns, the R-squared is typically
low and the abnormal returns highly signicant.
There is evidence of time-varying risk exposures in the carry trade (Chris-
tiansen, Ranaldo, and Söderllind (2010)). In particular, the exposure of the carry
to the stock market rises after shocks to liquidity and risk. This is not captured
by the unconditional analysis in table 6. So it is of interest to ask whether the
optimal strategy also has time-varying risk.
Following Christiansen, Ranaldo, and Söderllind (2010) we run the following
OLS regression:
rp;t  rft = +0RMRFt+1RMRFtzt 1+2Rbonds ;t+3Rbonds ;tzt 1+ "t (10)
where zt 1 is a proxy for (lagged) risk and Rbonds ;t is the excess return of the 10 year
US bond over the risk-free rate.22 As proxies for risk we use the foreign exchange
volatility, the TED spread, VIX, the average transaction cost, and leverage. The
rst four are also used in Christiansen, Ranaldo, and Söderllind (2010). We add
leverage as this is time varying in the optimal strategy and could naturally induce
time-varying risk.
The results of the regression are in table 7. The only interaction term that
is signicant is for the TED spread with the market. But the sign of the coe¢ -
cient is negative, implying the strategy is less exposed to the stock market after a
liquidity squeeze. In order for time-varying risk to explain the returns of the di-
versied strategy, the opposite should happen. All other interaction terms are not
21We retrieve the data from Adrien Verdelhans webpage. The data is for returns with all
currencies and after transaction costs.
22Bond returns are from Datastream.
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signicant, so time-varying risk is of little relevance to explain the performance
of the diversied strategy. In particular, there is no evidence that the optimal
strategy is riskier when it is more leveraged. In general, the conditional models do
not add much to the CAPM, and the large signicant  persists after considering
time-varying risk.
Either unconditionally or conditionally the risk factors proposed to explain
the carry trade can do very little to explain the returns of our optimal diversi-
ed currency strategy. This indicates that the optimal strategy exploits market
ine¢ ciencies rather than loading on factor risk premiums.
6 Value to diversied investors
We assess whether the currency strategies are relevant for investors already exposed
to the major asset classes. Indeed, there is no reason a priori that investors should
restrict themselves to pure currency strategies, particularly when there are other
risk factors that have consistently o¤ered signicant premiums as well.
The value of currency strategies to diversied investors holding bonds and
stocks is a relatively unexplored topic. Most of the literature on the currency
market has focused on currency-specic strategies. One exception is Kroencke,
Schindler, and Schrimpf (2011) who nd that combining investments in stocks
and bonds with currencies improves the Sharpe ratio from 0.34 to 0.43 without
entailing an increase in crash risk.
We continue to assume that the investor optimizes power utility with constant
relative risk aversion of 4. The returns on wealth are now:
Rp;t+1 = rf
US
t +
MX
j=1
wjFj +
NtX
i=1
wi;tri;t+1  
NtX
i=1
jwi;tj ci;t (11)
where wj are the (constant) weights on a set of M investable factors F expressed
as excess returns, and wi;t depends on the characteristics and the  coe¢ cients
that maximize utility jointly with wj.
Table 8 shows the OOS performance of the portfolios with and without the
currency strategy. The currency strategy combines the interest rate spread, sign,
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momentum, and long-term reversal. Subsequently, each two rows compare a port-
folio of investable factors with a portfolio combining these factors with the currency
strategy.
The opportunity to invest in currencies is clearly valuable to investors. In-
cluding currencies in the portfolio always adds to the Sharpe ratio and raises the
certainty equivalent. The OOS gains in certainty equivalent range between 9.99
percentage points for an investment in stocks and bonds and 38.04 percentage
points for a diversied investment using the Carhart factors. The gain with re-
spect to the Carhart factors comes mainly from the dismal performance of stock
momentum in 2009, when it experienced one of its worst crashes in history (Daniel
and Moskowitz (2011), Barroso and Santa-Clara (2012)).
These gains are far more impressive than the gains from adding factors like
HML and SMB to the stock market. Indeed, only the inclusion of bonds improves
upon the certainty equivalent of the stock market OOS. Generally, the inclusion of
SMB, HML, and WML factors improves Sharpe ratios, but this increase is o¤set
by higher drawdowns, resulting in lower certainty equivalents.
Including currencies however leads to substantial gains. This extends the ev-
idence in Burnside (2011) that there is no known set of risk factors that prices
currency and stock returns simultaneously. The relevance of the interest rate
spread, currency momentum, and long-term reversal to forecast currency returns
makes all conventional risk premiums seem small in comparison.
Including currencies in the portfolio of stocks and bonds produces increases
in the Sharpe ratio as high as 0.81 for a portfolio of US stocks and currencies.
On average adding currency strategies increases the Sharpe ratio by 0.51. This
conrms the results of Kroencke, Schindler, and Schrimpf (2011).
One possible justication for the higher Sharpe ratios obtainable by investing
in currencies is that these might entail a higher crash risk  as Brunnermeier,
Nagel, and Pedersen (2008) shows for the carry trade. But diversied currency
strategies do not conform to this explanation. Figure 4 shows how complementing
a portfolio policy with investments in the currency market contributes to perfor-
mance, including kurtosis and skewness. The currency strategies increase Sharpe
ratios and certainty equivalents and, most notably, they also reduce substantially
the excess kurtosis and left-skewness of diversied portfolios.
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Our results make it hard to reconcile the economic value of currency investing
with the existence of some set of risk factors that drives returns in currencies and
other asset classes. The substantial increases in Sharpe ratios combined with the
lower crash risk indicate that there is either a specic set of risk factors in the
currency market or that currency returns have been anomalous throughout our
sample.
7 Speculative capital
We cannot justiy the protability of our currency strategy as compensation for
risk. The obvious alternative explanation is market ine¢ cieny. This might arise
due to insu¢ cient arbitrage capital, possibly because strategies exploring the cross
section of currency returns were not well known. Jylhä and Suominen (2011) nd
carry returns explain hedge fund returns controlling for the other factors proposed
by Fung and Hsieh (2004) and that growth in hedge fund speculative capital is
driving carry trade prots down.
Following Jylhä and Suominen (2011), we run an OLS regression of the returns
of the optimal strategy on hedge fund assets under management scaled by the
monetary aggregate M2 of the 11 currencies in their sample (AUM=M2) and new
fund ows (AUM=M2):23 The regression uses the out-of-sample returns, after
transaction costs, of the optimal strategy from 1996:03 to 2008:12 as the dependent
variable. The estimated coe¢ cients (and t-statistics in parenthesis) are:
rp;t = 0:08  1:47 (AUMM2 )t 1 +3:56 (AUMM2 )t
(4:29) ( 3:23) (0:36)
The new ow of capital to hedge funds is not signicant in the regression but
the estimated coe¢ cient has the correct sign. The level of hedge fund capital
predicts negatively the returns of the optimal strategy. With a t-statistic of -
3.23, this provides convincing evidence that the returns of the diversied currency
strategy are an anomaly that is gradually being corrected as more hedge fund
capital exploits it.
This opens the question whether the large returns of the strategy are likely
23We thank Matti Suominen for providing us the time series of AUM/M2. See their paper for
a more detailed description of the data.
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to continue going forward. We note that in the last three years of our sample
(2009-2011) the strategy produces a Sharpe ratio of 0.82, lower than its historical
average but still an impressive performance (though not much di¤erent than the
stock market in the same period).
8 Conclusion
Diversied currency investments using the information of momentum, yield di¤er-
ential, and reversal, outperform the carry trade substantially. This outperformance
materializes in a higher Sharpe ratio and in less severe drawdowns, as reversal and
momentum had large positive returns when the carry trade crashed. The perfor-
mance of our optimal currency strategy poses a problem to peso explanations of
currency returns.
Our optimal currency portfolio picks stable coe¢ cients for the relevant cur-
rency characteristics and, by dealing with transaction costs, outperforms naive
benchmarks proposed in the literature.
The economic performance of the optimal currency portfolio cannot be ex-
plained by risk factors or time-varying risk. This suggests market ine¢ ciency or,
at least, that the right risk factors to explain currency momentum and reversal
returns have not been identied yet. Investing in currencies signicantly improves
the performance of diversied portfolios already exposed to stocks and bonds. So
currencies either o¤er exposure to some set of unknown risk factors or have anom-
alous returns.
The most convincing explanation for the returns of our optimal diversied
currency portfolio is that it constitutes an anomaly one which is being gradually
arbitraged away as speculative capital increases in the foreign exchange market.
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Strategy Max Min Mean std kurt skew SR CE
fd 15.91 -25.39 19.23 19.47 4.48 -1.23 0.99 18.97
mom 17.31 -11.60 8.01 14.23 1.80 0.21 0.56 11.61
rev 8.38 -11.31 3.09 8.72 2.24 -0.26 0.36 8.95
sign 21.29 -30.11 17.96 18.74 7.35 -0.90 0.96 18.29
ca 2.79 -3.47 0.61 3.86 1.24 -0.44 0.16 7.59
q 2.02 -2.32 0.12 1.79 4.44 -0.74 0.07 7.34
fd, mom, rev, sign 56.83 -32.78 44.30 32.89 5.54 0.66 1.35 34.72
All 60.38 -25.56 45.28 33.70 5.10 0.60 1.34 34.85
Table 1. The in-sample performance of the investment strategies in the period
1976:02 to 1996:02. The optimizations use a power utility with CRRA of 4. The
mean, standard deviation and Sharpe ratio are annualized and Kurt. stands for
excess kurtosis.
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fd mom rev sign ca q
7,93 - - - - -
[0; 000] - - - - -
- 5,10 - - - -
- [0; 009] - - - -
- - 3,46 - - -
- - [0; 053] - - -
- - - 3,71 - -
- - - [0; 000] - -
- - - - -2,19 -
- - - - [0; 247] -
- - - - - -0,15
- - - - - [0; 648]
4,75 8,10 6,57 2,67 -4,95 -1,08
[0; 051] [0; 019] [0; 078] [0; 085] [0; 621] [0; 828]
7,09 7,26 4,37 2,44 - -
[0; 004] [0; 006] [0; 051] [0; 023] - -
Table 2. The statistical signicance of the variables in the in-sample period
of 1976:02 to 1996:02. The coe¢ cient estimates and bootstrapped p-values (in
brackets).
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Max Min Mean std kurt skew SR CE
Panel A: No transaction costs
fd 18,64 -29,20 21,38 24,33 2,15 -0,82 0,88 10,89
mom 14,72 -10,03 4,97 13,29 0,57 0,04 0,37 4,39
rev 9,42 -9,67 1,69 9,50 1,42 0,23 0,18 2,84
sign 16,40 -21,21 15,01 21,37 1,95 -0,64 0,70 8,03
all in 26,90 -22,88 38,02 32,98 0,12 -0,14 1,15 18,87
Panel B: With transaction costs
fd 4,59 -10,92 2,80 7,40 5,01 -1,35 0,38 4,55
mom 0,64 -1,33 -0,02 0,66 17,41 -2,43 -0,03 2,88
rev 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 18,62 2,06 0,05 2,91
sign 12,12 -16,30 8,89 15,70 2,14 -0,67 0,57 6,59
all in 20,39 -18,31 19,20 22,20 0,54 -0,16 0,86 12,15
Panel C: With wi;t = I(cit < jFDitj)

Txi;t=Nt

fd 12,83 -20,70 11,91 17,18 2,66 -0,89 0,69 8,35
mom 6,67 -7,01 2,14 6,04 2,37 -0,07 0,35 4,33
rev 3,44 -3,84 -0,37 3,00 4,66 -0,16 -0,12 2,36
sign 18,10 -23,09 12,08 20,23 2,74 -0,76 0,60 5,98
all in 26,70 -22,75 28,48 26,84 0,69 -0,16 1,06 16,69
Table 3. The OOS performance of the investment strategies in the period 1996:03
to 2011:12 with di¤erent methods to deal with transaction costs. Panel A presents
the results without considering transaction costs. Panel B takes transaction costs
into consideration. Panel C excludes all currencies whenever the bid-ask spread
is higher than the forward discount, then adjusts the forward discount by the
transaction cost. All optimizations use a power utility function with a CRRA of
4 and the coe¢ cients are re-estimated each month using an expanding window of
observations in the OOS period of 1996:03 to 2011:12.
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Strategy Max Min Mean std kurt skew SR CE
sign 24.72 -34.04 19.23 32.09 2.06 -0.61 0.60 -2.00
momb 63.26 -40.43 14.60 40.69 4.45 0.53 0.36 -17.53
sign+momb 55.78 -51.58 21.32 45.34 3.31 0.02 0.47 -27.72
fd 20.57 -29.16 17.54 23.77 2.73 -0.64 0.74 7.81
EW(sign; fd;mom; rev) 19.69 -25.77 22.76 27.09 1.17 -0.60 0.84 9.56
constant leverage 30.06 -22.39 27.73 27.89 0.92 -0.22 0.99 14.51
Optimal strategy 26.70 -22.75 28.48 26.84 0.69 -0.16 1.06 16.69
Table 4. The performance of naive portfolios in the OOS period compared to the
optimal strategy using sign, fd, momentum and reversal. The naive strategies have
a constant leverage of 5.94, the same as the optimal strategy on average. The OOS
returns are from 1996:03 to 2011:12. The optimization uses an expanding window
of returns, re-estimating the coe¢ cients each month. Results with transaction
costs.
Strategy  t-stat  t-stat R2
sign 1.39 3.58 0.62 14.92 54.20
momb 2.28 4.05 0.08 1.57 1.30
sign+momb 1.89 3.74 0.27 7.10 21.17
fd 1.43 3.02 0.65 9.56 32.71
EW(sign; fd;mom; rev) 0.68 2.72 0.89 28.85 81.57
Table 5. The OOS performance of the optimal strategy regressed on the naive
portfolios. The regressions are standard OLS regressions. The optimal strategy
uses sign, fd, momentum and reversal and re-estimates the coe¢ cients in the OOS
period every month. Results after transaction costs. The alphas are expressed in
percentage points per month. The OOS returns are from 1996:03 to 2011:12.
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1 2 3 4 Adj-Rsquared
ropt;t = + 1const + "t
2.08 1.31 - - - -0.10
[3:20] [0:90] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1TEDt + "t
2.38 -0.06 - - - 3.76
[4:31] [ 2:90] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1V IXt + "t
2.38 -0.46 - - - 7.27
[4:41] [ 3:98] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1ct + "t
2.37 26.80 - - - -0.42
[4:21] [0:45] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1FX:t + "t
2.38 -8.71 - - - 1.88
[4:28] [ 2:15] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1RMRFt + "t
2.19 0.44 - - - 7.43
[4:03] [4:02] - - - -
ropt;t = + 1RMRFt + 2SMB2 + 3HMLt + 4WMLt + "t
2.07 0.50 0.01 0.20 0.09 6.88
[3:74] [4:08] [0:05] [1:19] [0:87] -
ropt:t = + 1RXt + 2HMLFX:t + "t
1.73 0.32 1.35 - - 20.85
[3:37] [1:16] [6:54] - - -
Table 6. Risk exposures of the optimal strategy. We regress the OOS returns of
the optimal strategy (after transaction costs) on each set of risk factors. Standard
OLS coe¢ cients (and t-statistics in brackets). The OOS returns are from 1996:03
to 2011:12.
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z  RMRFt RMRFtzt 1 Rbonds;t Rbonds;tzt 1 Adj-rsquared
FX 2.26 0.46 -0.07 -0.22 0.00 6.70
[3:95] [3:73] [ 0:85] [ 0:77] [0:01] -
TED 2.09 0.52 -0.15 -0.04 -0.19 9.31
[3:69] [4:33] [ 2:35] [ 0:14] [ 1:39] -
VIX 2.26 0.52 -0.15 -0.15 -0.07 7.51
[3:99] [3:99] [ 1:60] [ 0:53] [ 0:51] -
c 2.22 0.46 -0.08 -0.18 0.01 6.77
[3:85] [3:79] [ 1:04] [ 0:63] [0:06] -
leverage 2.20 0.46 0.15 -0.18 0.04 7.07
[3:84] [3:88] [1:29] [ 0:71] [0:14] -
Table 7. Time-varying risk of the optimal strategy. In each row we regress the
OOS returns, after transaction costs, of the optimal strategy on the market and
bond returns, using a di¤erent risk proxy as a state variable to account for time-
varying risk exposure. We standardize all risk proxies subtracting the mean and
dividing by the standard deviation.Standard OLS coe¢ cients and t-statistics (in
brackets). The optimal strategy uses sign, fd, momentum and reversal and re-
estimates the coe¢ cients in the OOS period every month. The OOS returns are
from 1996:03 to 2011:12.
Strategy Max Min Mean STD Kurt. Skew SR CE
fd, mom, rev and sign 26,70 -22,75 28,48 26,84 0,69 -0,16 1,06 16,69
Stock market 7,16 -14,94 3,17 12,46 1,36 -0,81 0,25 2,83
Stock market+curr. 27,27 -21,87 27,95 26,93 0,73 -0,16 1,04 16,07
FF factors 19,89 -29,96 12,94 27,41 1,53 -0,84 0,47 -1,53
FF factors+curr. 31,75 -22,26 27,06 25,79 1,32 0,13 1,05 16,83
Carhart factors 33,51 -63,23 20,84 35,67 8,02 -1,37 0,58 -30,46
Carhart factors+curr. 19,29 -24,21 15,78 22,92 0,94 -0,45 0,69 7,58
Stocks and bonds 8,13 -13,74 5,39 12,16 2,15 -0,93 0,44 5,19
Stock and bonds+curr. 23,53 -22,67 27,98 27,47 0,80 -0,28 1,02 15,19
Table 8. The OOS performance of portfolios combining a currency strategy
with di¤erent background assets. The currency strategy uses momentum, the
interest rate spread, reversal and sign. Each row denoted with +curr. combines
the available factors with the currency strategy. Results with transaction costs.
Optimizations carried out with a CRRA of 4 and 240 months in the initial in-
sample estimate. The OOS period is from 1996:03 to 2011:12.
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Figure 1. The performance of Deutsche Bank currency ETFs (in euros). Each
line plots the cumulative monthly returns of a Deutsche Bank ETF from 2008:01
to 2011:12.
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Figure 2. The estimates of the coe¢ cients of the portfolio in the OOS period from
1996:03 to 2011:12. Optimization with CRRA of 4 and considering transaction
costs.
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Figure 3. OOS performance of the strategies versus naive portfolios in the period
of 1996:03 to 2011:12. The naive currency strategies have a constant leverage of
5.94 to match the mean leverage of the optimized strategy in the OOS period.
Returns after transaction costs.
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Figure 4. The OOS value of currency strategies for investors exposed to di¤erent
background risks. Each set of columns shows the performance of an optimized
portfolio with the available assets (light grey) and one which combines it with
the currency strategy (dark grey). The currency strategy uses the information on
the interest rate spread, sign, momentum and reversal. The OOS period is from
1996:03 to 2011:12. Results with transaction costs.
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